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Abstract
In this paper we have analyzed how the effects of monetary policy
in Norway might have been changing over time. In particular, we
have paid special attention to how the impact of policy shocks on key
economic variables (such as GDP, industrial production, consumption,
CPI, stock price index and employment) have evolved around the time
of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
By using a FAVAR framework based on a data set of 122 Norwe-
gian variables and estimating the model recursively from 2000:M1 to
2014:M12, we show that the effects of monetary policy on our vari-
ables are indeed time-varying. The impulse responses of key economic
variables to a monetary policy shock strengthen as we enter into a
period of financial turmoil in late-2008. In general, we find that if a
policy shock were to happen around late-2008 its cumulated impact
on a variable after 50 months would be stronger than if the shock were
to happen, say, before the crisis. It seems that the cumulated effect
of a policy shock is the strongest precisely during the worst moment
of the crisis - the period right after bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers.
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1 Introduction
The financial crisis that started in 2008 had severe impact on the world
economy on several fronts. The crisis did not only lead to the worst world-
wide economic contraction since the Great Depression, it also seemed to have
impaired people’s confidence in monetary authorities’ ability to manage the
economy [Mishkin, 2011]. Most notably, Nobel laureate Paul Krugman has
long argued that the recent crisis had led the US. economy into a state in
which the usual monetary policy tools, e.g. reducing short-term interest rate,
”have lost all traction” [Krugman, 2008]. Other prominent economists such
as John Cochrane1 and Frederic Mishkin maintain, on the other hand, that
aggressive cuts in policy rate by the US. Federal Reserve had not only been
effective in limiting the repercussions of the crisis, but the policy actions had
been even more potent than during normal times [Mishkin, 2009].
As the world economy starts to recover from the wounds of the recent cri-
sis and policy makers around the world begin to end their ”crisis regimes”, we
are presented with ample opportunities to evaluate the impact of monetary
doctrines and policies. In this regard an accurate measurement of the effects
of monetary policy tools is essential for the further discourse, and especially
the question of monetary policy effectiveness during the crisis is becoming
increasingly relevant.
The crisis in Norway is a particularly interesting case for several reasons.
Firstly, in contrast to many developed countries, the impact of the recent
crisis on the Norwegian economy has been limited, except for the stock mar-
1For a spirited reply to Krugman’s New York Times article ”How Did Economists Get
It So Wrong”, see John Cochrane’s blog post ”How Did Paul Krugman get it so Wrong”.
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ket. Even during the height of the financial turmoil in 2008-2009, Norway
suffered only a mild stagnation of one percent and had substantially lower
unemployment than almost any comparable western economies [Grytten and
Hunnes, 2010]. Secondly, in dealing with the crisis, Norges Bank (the Norwe-
gian central bank) responded by only using conventional policy tools. During
the initial stage of the crisis Norges Bank enacted significant cuts in its key
policy rate. From 5.75 percent in October 2008 the key rate was reduced to
record-low 1.25 percent a year later. Beside policy rate cuts Norges Bank
also provided extraordinary liquidity measures to support the banking sys-
tem, and did not see the need for unconventional measures of the type used
by US. Federal Reserve. Thus, when analyzing policy actions in Norway the
confounding factors presented by unconventional measures such as quanti-
tative easing will not be present. Thirdly, compared to many other western
countries the financial crisis in Norway was relatively short-lived. OECD de-
clared, already in 2010, that Norwegian economy had avoided the immediate
dangers of crisis and the authorities’ main challenges were to withdraw the
extraordinary monetary and fiscal measures in order to prevent overheating
the economy [OECD, 2010]. The absence of a prolonged crisis means that the
Norwegian economic time-series can be conveniently divided into ”pre-crisis”,
”crisis” and ”post-crisis” periods.
In this study we seek to provide an empirical analysis of how the effects
of monetary policy in Norway might have been changing over time. More
specifically, we seek to assess the effects of monetary policy shocks on key
macroeconomic variables and evaluate whether these effects have varied over
the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods.
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With these goals in mind we adopt the factor-augmented vector autore-
gressive (FAVAR) approach of analyzing monetary policy effects. Since the
pioneering work of Sims [1980], the vector autoregression (VAR) framework
has been the workhorse in empirical analysis of monetary policy. This frame-
work provides a systematic way to capture the rich dynamics in multiple time
series and a coherent approach to policy analysis [Stock and Watson, 2001].
However, the low-dimension nature of these models ignores the usually large
information set used by central banks. Therefore, measurement of policy in-
novation is likely to be contaminated [Bernanke et al., 2005]. The standard
illustration of this problem is the ”price puzzle”, the common finding that a
contractionary monetary policy shock induces a slight increase in the price
level. Sims’ explanation of the puzzle is that it is the result of imperfectly
controlling for the extra information that the central bank has on future
inflation. To remedy the shortcomings of low-dimensional VARs we choose
the FAVAR framework, in which VARs are augmented with latent common
factors extracted from a large data set of 122 economic variables.
The FAVAR model is estimated using a two-step principal component
method developed by Bernanke et al. [2005]. In the first step, we estimate a
small number of latent factors based on a version of the dynamic factor model
outlined in Stock and Watson [1998, 2002]. In the second step, the estimated
factors are used in a standard VAR in order to identify and measure the ef-
fects of monetary policy shocks. Finally, in order to allow for time-variation
in policy effects we estimate the model recursively over the sample 2000:M1
- 2014:M12. That is, the FAVAR model is estimated repeatedly based on in-
crementally increased data sample length. Starting with a sample spanning
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from 2000:M1 to 2007:M1, the FAVAR model is re-estimated repeatedly by
adding one month of data at a time. In this way, we allow for heterogene-
ity in the estimated coefficients along the time dimension whilst keeping the
computational cost manageable. In all, 96 estimations of FAVAR are done
using sample length from 2000:M1 - 2007:M1 to 2000:M1 - 2014:M12. Subse-
quently, the changing effects of monetary policy is investigated by assessing
the impulse responses of key economic variables to an one-standard-deviation
shock in the policy variable. Since the recursive estimation provide a large
number of impulse responses over time, we pool all responses to construct
a contour/”heat” map so that both the time-variation and the magnitude
of the responses can be assessed simultaneously. This procedure is done for
six key economic variables: real GDP, industrial production, consumption
expenditure, stock price index, consumer price index and employment.
Our results show that the effects of monetary policy on our variables of
interest in Norway are indeed time-varying. Also, we find evidence that sup-
ports the notion that the impact of monetary policy is stronger at the height
of the crisis. The impulse responses of all six variables to a monetary pol-
icy shock first remain rather homogeneous before the crisis and subsequently
strengthen as we move into the crisis period. Further, for real GDP, in-
dustrial production, consumption expenditure and stock price index we find
that the cumulated effect of a policy shock seems to be the strongest precisely
during the worst moment of the crisis - the period right after bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers. That is, if a monetary policy shock were to happen around
late-2008, its impact on the above-mentioned variables would be larger than
otherwise. For instance, if an one-standard-deviation policy shock were to
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happen on November 2008 its cumulated effect on real GDP after 50 months
would be almost -0.60. If, instead, the shock were to happen on January
2007 the cumulated effect on real GDP would be only -0.15 after 50 months.
For consumer price index and employment we find that even though the
strongest responses do not coincide with the bankruptcy of Lehman Broth-
ers there still seems to be a noticeable increase in the cumulated impact of
monetary policy around that time.
This paper makes two contributions with respect to the related literature.
First, as far as we are aware, this is the first attempt to combine a FAVAR
model with time-varying recursive estimation to measure the changing impact
of monetary policy in Norway. Second, our results are in line with and
reinforce the existing studies done on the European level. For instance,
Ciccarelli et al. [2013] show significant variation over time of the responses
of GDP growth to a monetary policy shock, with peak impact on GDP
during the height of the financial crisis being both significantly stronger and
faster. Also, Bagzibagli [2012] shows that the global financial crisis leads to
important variations in the responses of nominal variables such as price level
and money supply.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide
a summary of the relevant background literature and theory. We present a
number of existing empirical studies on monetary policy effects and a back-
ground for the FAVAR framework. Section 3 describes the theoretical foun-
dations of our preferred econometrical framework. Section 4 first summarizes
the choice and treatment of data used in the estimation, and subsequently
describes some practical aspects of the implementation of FAVAR. In sec-
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tion 5 we present the relevant output from the FAVAR estimation in the
form of impulse responses. Moreover, we check the robustness of our results
to changes in certain assumptions of the model. Finally, section 6 draws
the main conclusions and presents possible extensions of our work for future
research.
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2 Summary of literature
2.1 Why look at shocks?
The central feature of our analysis is the assessment of monetary policy
shocks. In this regard, the choice to focus on shocks when measuring policy
effect should first be motivated. Why not simply analyze the actions of
monetary policy makers?
Christiano et al. [1996] argued that monetary policy actions in the tra-
ditional sense reflect, in part, policy makers’ responses to non-monetary de-
velopment in the economy. These patterns of response are often summarized
in feedback rules, which relate policy actions to the state of the economy
represented by variables such as the inflation, real output and etc. To the
extend that a policy action is the result of such feedback rule, the responses of
economic variables following this action would represent the combined effect
of the action itself and the variables that the policy reacts to. Therefore, to
capture the effects of monetary policy per se one needs to isolate and identify
the component of the policy that is not reactive to other economic variables.
An illustration of such feedback rules is a so-called ”Taylor-type” rule
[Taylor, 1993]. In its simplest form it relates the level of policy instrument
(rt) to important economic variables such as output gap and inflation gap,
rt = βy(yt − y∗) + βpi(pit − pi∗) + εt, (1)
where (yt−y∗) and (pit−pi∗) denote output gap and inflation gap respectively.
More generally, feedback rules that relate the policy instrument, e.g. key
9
interest rate, to the various elements in the economy can be expressed as
rt = f(Ωt) + εt, (2)
where the (unspecified) policy rule is given by f(Ωt), and it characterizes the
endogenous part of monetary policy. It gives the appropriate policy action
based on policy makers’ information set Ωt, which potentially contains a
large number of economic variables. The term εt then denotes changes in the
policy instrument not based on the information set Ωt. Consequently, εt is
the part of monetary policy that fulfills requirement of not reacting to other
economic variables. This component is often referred to as the exogenous
part of policy action, or as an exogenous policy shock. Another common way
of characterizing the different components of monetary policy is to denote
policy makers’ choice of reaction coefficients in f(Ω) (such as βy and βpi from
equation (1) when f(Ωt) is specified) as systematic monetary policy, and εt as
unsystematic policy. Hence, we follow Christiano et al. [1996] in interpreting
the question ”how does the economy react to a monetary policy action?” as
”how does the economy react to an exogenous policy shock which represent
the unsystematic part of monetary policy?”.
On the note of the meaning of shocks, another clarification is needed.
Hoover and Jorda [2001] pointed out that the usual method of analysing pol-
icy shocks and the way the results are interpreted (implicitly) assume policy
actions to be unsystematic as well as unanticipated. More critically, there
is often no clear distinction between the two terms. The implication is that
the term εt is always a surprise. In a typical rational-expectation framework
with surprise-only aggregate supply, it means unsystematic monetary policies
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always have real effects.
Hoover and Jorda [2001] argued, however, that this equivalency between
unsystematic and unanticipated policies is not necessarily always valid. If
we consider the systematic elements of policies as what monetary authori-
ties usually do, it is conceivable that certain policy actions might be both
atypical (unsystematic) and predictable (anticipated). Hoover and Jorda
[2001] pointed to the liquidity injection by the Federal Reserve in anticipa-
tion of the so-called ”Y2K” demand as one such example. For our purposes
it seems plausible that during a financial crisis the characterization of poli-
cies as both unsystematic and anticipated could again be applicable. During
financial turmoils, especially one on the scale of what we recently witnessed,
economic agents are likely to correctly expect monetary authorities to enact
extraordinary, i.e. atypical, policies that match the severity of the crisis.
In a simple rational-expectation framework with surprise-only aggregate
supply this would suggest we should expect unsystematic policies during
crises to have negligible effects. However, the rational-expectation framework
in its simplest form is a rather extreme case. Cochrane [1998] proposed
a potentially more realistic intermediate version in which only a portion
of economic agents form fully rational expectations while the rest do not.
With such a model it can be shown that even unsystematic policies that
are anticipated can be real effects2. Thus, we base our expectation on this
intermediate framework and anticipate unsystematic policies to have real
effects, regardless of whether they are anticipated.
2See Hoover and Jorda [2001] for a simple algebraic illustration.
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2.2 Strategies for isolating policy shocks
Having established the motivation for assessing monetary policy shocks the
next step is to decide on a strategy to identify such shocks. Christiano et al.
[1996] showed that there are, in general, two categories of strategy for isolat-
ing monetary policy shocks. The first is the so-called ”narrative approach”,
pioneered by Friedman and Schwartz in their Monetary History of the United
States. The central element of the narrative approach is the identification
of monetary shocks through non-statistical procedures. It involves investiga-
tion of historical records, such as minutes of the monetary authorities’ policy
deliberations, to pinpoint decisions that might account for significant mon-
etary disturbances. The goal is to identify episodes of large shifts in policy
assumed not to be driven by development of the real economy.
Romer and Romer [1989] identified six shocks with this narrative ap-
proach in the post-World War 2 era. They showed that a shift to anti-
inflationary policy led, on average, to a 12 percent reduction in industrial
production and two percentage points increase in the unemployment rate.
More recently, Romer and Romer [2003] combined narrative and quantita-
tive records to produce a key interest rate ”shock series” free of endogenous
responses to economic developments. They found monetary policy shocks to
have large and statistically significant effects on both output and inflation
for the United States. Using the same narrative method Cloyne and Hurt-
gen [2014] demonstrated that a 100 basis point tightening of the Bank Rate
in UK leads to a decline in output of 0.6 percent and one percentage point
reduction in inflation after two to three years.
However, given the extensive use of policy makers’ internal documents
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the narrative approach to isolating policy shocks would not be suitable for
our purposes. Thus, we will concentrate on the second category of strategy
labelled the ”vector autoregressive (VAR) approach”.
2.3 The vector autoregressive (VAR) approach
Christopher Sims first introduced the VAR models in his influential 1980
article Macroeconomics and Reality. The new framework was intended as
an alternative to the large-scale macroeconomic models in the tradition of
the Cowles Commission. The new methodology grew out of a dissatisfaction
with large scales models in which identification was achieved by excluding
variables without theoretical justification [Bjornland, 2000]. The identifica-
tion procedure of large-scale models contradicted the notion that often all
of the macroeconomic variables in a complex system are endogenously and
simultaneously determined.
A VAR, on the other hand, is a system of n-variables and n-equations in
which each variable is determined by its own lagged values, and past values
(and possibly current values) of the remaining n−1 variables. Thus the VAR
approach, in which all variables in question are endogenously determined, of-
fers a more credible framework for empirical macroeconomic studies, without
what Sims called ”incredible” (non-justifiable) exclusion restrictions. VAR
models also have the advantage of not requiring complete specification of the
structure of the economy.
The VAR approach of isolating monetary policy shocks involves making
enough identifying assumptions so that the monetary authorities’ feedback
functions can be estimated and thus isolating policy shocks [Christiano et al.,
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1996]. Assumptions regarding a number of things must be made including
the functional form of feedback rule, economic variables covered in the pol-
icy makers’ information set and what primary policy instrument is. Most
critically, assumptions must be made regarding the interaction between pol-
icy shocks and variables in the information set. One common identifying
assumption is that policy shocks are orthogonal to these variables, the so-
called recursiveness assumption. It implies that the correlation between pol-
icy shocks and other economic shocks is removed and, in practical terms,
variables in the information set only respond to policy shocks with a lag.
Several other identification schemes exist such as long-run restrictions and
sign restrictions. Long-run restrictions are based on theoretical long-run neu-
trality properties such as monetary policy shocks not having long-run impact
on real economic activities. The idea is that if plausible long-run neutrality
assumptions can be imposed, then reliable short-run inferences regarding the
dynamics of the economy can also be drawn [Faust and Leeper, 1994]. In a
similar fashion, sign restrictions entail assumptions on the dynamic reaction
of certain variables, e.g. that prices do not increase after a contractionary
policy shock.
Following the work of Bernanke and Blinder [1992] and Sims [1992], a sub-
stantial body of literature have used VAR methods to identity and measure
effects of monetary policy shocks on macroeconomic variables. These VAR
methods generally deliver empirically credible descriptions of the dynamic
responses of the variables to monetary policy changes. Here, we only seek
to provide a picture of the typical results from VAR analyses and give some
illustrative examples due to the sheer size of VAR literature. Christiano et al.
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[1999] and Auer [2014] showed that there is considerable agreement over the
qualitative effect of a policy shock across a large number of identification
schemes. A contractionary policy shock generally lead to fall in aggregate
output, investment, employment, profits, monetary aggregates and various
measure of wages. A range of empirical estimates have shown that one per-
centage point increase in policy instrument has effect on output and inflation
at between 0.5 and 1.0 percent [Cloyne and Hurtgen, 2014]. For instance,
using sign restriction Uhlig [2005] found that for the US economy a con-
tractionary policy shock of one percent would lead to 0.8 percent decrease
in GDP and decline in prices of 0.4 percent. With the same methodology,
Mountford [2005] demonstrated a fall in GDP of 0.6 percent and a decline
in GDP deflator of 0.15 percent for the UK economy. Koray and McMillin
[1999] and Kim [2001], based on recursive identification scheme, found initial
improvement and subsequent deterioration of the US trade balance following
a contractionary policy shock.
2.4 Factor-augmented VAR approach
The VAR approach does not, however, lack for criticism. Bernanke et al.
[2005] highlighted several shortcomings of the VAR methods. One major
weakness of VAR models is the fact that they are small-scale models that
incorporate relatively few variables. In order to conserve degrees of freedom
in estimation a typical VAR rarely employ more than six to eight variables.
This contradicts the fact that central banks monitor hundreds of data series
when deciding on their policy stance.
There are mainly three problems with using sparse information sets in a
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VAR model. First, if central banks and the private sector have information
that is not reflected in the VAR, then the empirical results will most likely be
polluted. The price puzzle mentioned in the introduction is often considered
an example of such contamination. Secondly, using sparse information sets
requires that we take a stand on which observable variables should repre-
sent more general economic concepts such as economic activity and inflation,
which could often be a somewhat arbitrary exercise. For instance, the gen-
eral concept of economic activity may not be perfectly covered by using real
GDP or industrial production in a VAR. Finally, the impulse response func-
tions can only be estimated for the small set of variables included in the
VAR. This prevents the assessment of the dynamics of other variables that
the central bank may care about, and thus limit our ability to have a more
comprehensive evaluation of the economy.
Recent research on dynamic factor models suggests that a small number
of factors can effectively summarize large amounts of information about econ-
omy. Therefore, a natural solution to the challenges faced by standard VARs
would be to combine a VAR model with factor analysis. Bernanke et al.
[2005] introduced the factor-augmented VAR framework in which a standard
VAR is augmented with estimated factors that effectively summarize infor-
mation from a large data set. The authors outlined two alternative estimation
procedures; a two-step method based on principal components and a more
computationally demanding Bayesian method based on Gibbs sampling. In
general, both methods produced qualitatively similar results that are in line
with economic theory. For example, a policy tightening would lead to decline
in real activity, money aggregates and prices. The authors did find, however,
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that the two-step method tends to produce more plausible responses. More
interestingly, the price puzzle disappeared in the FAVAR framework, which
provide some support for the view that the puzzle results from exclusion of
conditioning information.
Stock and Watson [2005] found, using a two-step estimation method
with principal components, results confirming the findings of Bernanke et al.
[2005]. An increase in federal funds rate led to a decline in employment and
industrial production of 0.5 percent and 1.0 percent, respectively. Also in
line with the results of Bernanke et al. [2005], Bork [2009] used expectation-
maximization algorithms to estimate the FAVAR and confirmed that using
large information set solved the price puzzle. Moreover, Ahmadi and Uhlig
[2007] estimated a FAVAR model using Bayesian estimation and identified via
sign restrictions to show, compared to previous studies, qualitatively similar
results. Blaes [2009] estimated a FAVAR model to find that in the short-
run, portfolio shifts due to rise in the short-term interest rate may increase
the money growth. However, in the long run the M3 is growing at a slower
pattern due to a restrictive monetary policy.
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3 Econometric framework
For the estimation of FAVAR we follow the two-step principal component
approach used by Bernanke et al. [2005]. In the first step, we estimate a
small number of latent factors based on a dynamic factor model using the
principal component method. Subsequently, the estimated factors are used
in a standard VAR model in order to identify and measure the effects of
monetary policy shocks.
3.1 Dynamic factor models
Dynamic factor models were first proposed by Geweke [1977] as a time-series
extension to the static factor models designed for cross-sectional data. Since
the early influential work of Geweke [1977] and Sargent and Sims [1977]
dynamic factor models has received considerable attention. Versions of the
dynamic generalization of the classic factor analysis have been used by several
researchers to study dynamic covariation among sets of economic variables3.
The premise of a dynamic factor model is that a time-series variable can
be seen as linear combination of a common component, driven by a small
number of latent factors, and an idiosyncratic component. Moreover, it is the
dynamic factors that drive the co-movements of a large number of variables.
Regarding the theoretical formulation of the model an important distinc-
tion must be made between an exact and an approximate formulation of a
dynamic factor model. The exact formulation assumes the idiosyncratic com-
ponent of the variables to be cross-sectionally and serially independent and
3See Stock and Watson [2010] for an excellent survey on dynamic factor models.
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uncorrelated with the common factors. As Stock and Watson [1998] pointed
out, these assumptions are rather implausible for most macroeconomic appli-
cations. Therefore, an approximate factor model which allows for moderate
correlation between the common factors and the idiosyncratic components,
and limited dependence among the latter may be more appropriate. Thus
for our purposes we follow the approximate dynamic factor model as de-
scribed in Stock and Watson [1998, 2002] and estimate the factors using the
non-parametric principal component method4 .
Let Xt be an N-dimensional multiple time series, observed for t = 1, ..., T ,
where Xt is stationary and standardized to have zero mean and unit variance.
We assume that Xt admits a dynamic factor model representation with r¯
common dynamic factors ft,
Xit = λi(L)ft + eit, (3)
for i = 1, ..., N , where e = (eit, ..., eNt)
′ is an N × 1 vector of idiosyncratic
disturbances and λi(L) is a lag polynomial in non-negative powers of L.
Importantly, λi(L) is modeled to have finite orders of at most q, i.e. λi(L) =∑q
j=0 λijL
j, and equation (3) can be conveniently rewritten as
Xt = ΛFt + et, (4)
where Ft = (f
′
t , ..., f
′
t−q)
′ is a r × 1 vector of static factors and Λ is an N × r
matrix of loadings and the ith row of Λ is (λi0, ..., λiq). Since the factors Ft
appear to enter only contemporaneously, equation (4) is therefore referred to
4Stock and Watson refer to factors as ”diffusion indexes”.
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as the static representation of the dynamic factor model.
The main advantage of this static representation is that the factors can
be estimated using principal components. Moreover, this static form is not as
restrictive as it seems in practice because Ft can be interpreted as including
arbitrary lags of the dynamic factors ft. Stock and Watson [1998] showed the
theoretical results for the estimation of equation (4) by principal components.
The principal component estimator of Ft is a weighted averaging estimator
and is derived as the solution to the least squares problem5,
minF1,...,Ft,Λ Vr(Λ, F ) =
1
NT
T∑
t=1
(Xt − ΛFt)′(Xt − ΛFt), (5)
subject to the normalization N−1Λ′Λ = Ir. Stock and Watson [1998] showed
that the solution to this classical principal components problem is to set Λˆ
equal toN
1
2 times the eigenvectors of sample covariance matrix corresponding
to its r largest eigenvalues. Given the normalization, Λ′Λ = NIr, the least
square estimator of Ft is
Fˆt = N
−1Λ′Xt, (6)
which are the scaled first r principal components of Xt. Let Zˆ be the eigen-
vectors of the sample covariance matrix, the principal components estimator
5The actual formulation of the minimization problem here is slightly different than
what is presented in Stock and Watson [1998]. In Stock and Watson [1998] the minimiza-
tion is expressed in terms of the individual time-series variables Xit. Here, the minimiza-
tion is expressed in terms of the vector of containing all variables Xt. Following Stock and
Watson [2010] this formulation was chosen to give it a ”cleaner” look.
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of Ft is thus given by
Fˆt = N
−1(N
1
2 Zˆ)′Xt (7)
Fˆt =
1
N
1
2
Zˆ ′Xt (8)
3.2 Determination of number of (static) factors
One important empirical question is how many factors should be extracted
from the large set of economic data. Stock and Watson [2010] suggest to
determine the number of factors by a combination of a-priori knowledge,
visual inspection of the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix of the data set,
and optimizing a particular information criterion. For instance, Stock and
Watson [1998] showed with a simulation study that standard measures such
as Akaike and Bayesian information criteria perform reasonably well.
More recently, Bai and Ng [2002] developed a class of estimators for r (the
number of static factors) that are motivated by information criteria used in
model selection. The authors propose information criteria that trade off the
benefit of including additional factors against the cost of increased variabil-
ity coming from estimating another parameter. Two classes of information
criteria were introduced:
PC(k) = V (Λˆk, Fˆk) + kg(N, T ) (9)
IC(k) = ln
(
V (Λˆk, Fˆk)
)
+ kg(N, T ) (10)
where V (Λˆk, Fˆk) is the sum of squared residuals from a k-factor
6 model as
6Note that k denotes the assumed number of factors, while r denotes the true number.
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defined in equation (5), Λˆk and Fˆk are the estimated factors and loadings
from the k-factor model, and g(N, T ) is a penalty function such that g(N, T )
goes to zero and min{N, T}g(N, T ) goes to infinity as (N, T ) goes to infinity.
Several forms of the penalty function g(N, T ) were suggested:
g1(N, T ) =
(
N + T
NT
)
ln
(
NT
N + T
)
(11)
g2(N, T ) =
(
N + T
NT
)
ln (min{N, T}) (12)
g3(N, T ) =
(
ln (min{N, T})
min{N, t}
)
(13)
A specific choice for g(N, T ) that performs well in simulation studies turns out
to be g2(N, T ) [Stock and Watson, 2010]. Following Stock and Watson [2010],
the combination IC2(k) = IC(k) + g2(N, T ) will be used as the information
criterion of choice:
IC2(k) = ln
(
V (Λˆk, Fˆk)
)
+ k
(
N + T
NT
)
ln (min{N, T}) , (14)
and the combination PC2(k) = PC(k) + g2(N, T ) will be used as a check.
3.3 Factor-augmented VAR
Let Yt be an M × 1 vector of observable economic variables assumed to
have pervasive effect on the economy. It is, however, plausible that there
is additional economic information relevant to modelling of the dynamics
of the economy that is not fully captured by Yt. Suppose this additional
information can be summarized by a k × 1 vector of unobserved factors Ft,
where k is small. Following Bernanke et al. [2005], we assume that the joint
22
dynamics of (Ft, Yt) are given by:Ft
Yt
 = Φ(L)
Ft−1
Yt−1
+ vt, (15)
where Φ(L) = Φ1 + Φ2L+ Φ3L
2 + ...+ ΦdL
d−1 is a conformable lag polyno-
mial of finite order d, Φj is the coefficient matrix and vt is zero-mean errors
with covariance matrix Q. Equation (15) is often referred to as the transi-
tion equation and Bernanke et al. [2005] denoted it factor-augmented vector
autoregression.
Note that equation (15) cannot be estimated directly as the factors Ft
are unobservable. Nevertheless, if we interpret Ft and Yt as common forces
that drive the dynamics of many economic variables, it is possible to infer
something about the factors based on a large set of these variables. Let Xt
be a N×1 vector of background or ”informational” variables. The number of
informational variables is large and will be assumed to much greater than the
number of factors and observed variables. Following Bernanke et al. [2005],
the relationship between informational variables Xt, unobserved factors Ft
and observed variables Yt can be expressed by an observation equation,
Xt = Λ
fFt + Λ
yYt + et, (16)
where Λf is an N × k matrix of factor loadings, Λy is an N ×M matrix,
and et is an N × 1 vector of error terms that are mean zero and assumed
to display a small amount of cross-correlation. Hence, conditional on Yt,
Xt can be viewed as noisy measures of the underlying unobserved factors
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Ft. Note that equation (16) implies Xt only depend on current and not
lagged values of factors. Just as the case for the static form of dynamic
factor model in the previous section, this is not restrictive in practice since
Ft can be interpreted as containing arbitrary lags of the fundamental factors.
Equation (16), without the observable factors, can be seen as equivalent to
the static form of dynamic factor model (4).
To estimate (15) and (16), we adopt the two-step principal components
approach used by Bernanke et al. [2005]. This is a non-parametric way of
uncovering the space spanned by the common components, Ct = (Ft, Yt),
in (16). In the first step, Ct is estimated using the principal component
estimator described in the previous section. Stock and Watson [2002] showed
that when N is large and the number of principal components extracted is
at least as large as the true number of factors, the principal components
consistently recover the space spanned by Ft and Yt. Next, Ft is obtained as
the part of the space covered by Ct that is not covered by Yt. In the second
step, FAVAR (15) is estimated by standard procedures with F replaced by
Fˆt.
Furthermore, given that we are mainly interested in analyzing the impulse
responses of various variables to monetary policy shocks we can rewrite equa-
tion (15),
Ft
Yt
 = Φ(L)
Ft−1
Yt−1
+ vt ⇐⇒ Φ∗(L)
Ft
Yt
 = vt, (17)
where Φ∗(L) = I − Φ(L)(L) = I − Φ1L − ... − ΦdLd. The advantage of
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expressing equation (15) in this way is that the impulse response functions
of Ft can be found asFt
Yt
 = vt = ∞∑
j=0
ΨjL
ivt =
∞∑
j=0
Ψjvt−j, (18)
where Φ∗(L) is assumed to be invertible and [Φ∗(L)]−1 =
∑∞
j=0 ΨjL
i. Next,
the impulse response functions of each variable i in Xt can be calculated by
the following transformation:
XIRFit = [Λˆ
f
i Λˆ
y
i ](
∞∑
j=0
Ψjvt−j), (19)
where Λˆfi and Λˆ
y
i are factor loadings estimated for variable i according to
equation (16).
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4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data
The data set consists of a balanced panel of 122 monthly macroeconomic
time-series variables for Norway spanning from 2000:M1 to 2014:M12. The
starting date of the sample was chosen for several reasons. Firstly, 2000:M1
was chosen to maximize both the length and the variety of Norwegian eco-
nomic data in our sample. Secondly, it was chosen to approximately corre-
spond with a regime change in Norwegian monetary policy. In 1999 Norges
Bank abandoned its long-held fixed exchange rate regime and (unofficially)
adopted flexible inflation-targeting7. Hence, the choice of 2000:M1 was made
so to avoid having the data set straddle two different policy regimes and the
potential effects of regime change on the underlying structure of the economy.
Further, we prefer to use monthly data instead of quarterly data because
a balanced quarterly panel from 2000 to 2014 may not have enough obser-
vations to ensure precise estimation. Interestingly, Stock and Watson [2002]
showed that factors can still be extracted from a data set with irregularities
such as missing values, unbalanced panels and mixed sampling frequencies.
In these cases standard principal component method described in previous
section no longer applies. However, the expectation-maximization (EM) algo-
rithm can be used to estimate the factors by solving a suitable minimization
problem iteratively8. For our purposes we chose not to explore this option
and work exclusively with monthly data due to the EM algorithm’s compu-
tational complexity.
7The change was formalized in 2001 [Kleivset, 2012].
8See Stock and Watson [2002] Appendix A for details.
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The data set is chosen to reflect a broad range of economic concepts such
as economic activity, prices and other financial indicators. The individual
series are chosen from the following categories: real output, employment and
earnings, real consumption, housing starts, price indices, exchange rates,
interest rates, stock price indices, money aggregates and credit conditions,
and confidence indicators9. Most of the non-financial series are taken from
Statistics Norway’s (SSB) StatBank, while the financial series such as stock
prices and interest rates were taken from Oslo Stock Exchange, Norges Bank’s
data bases and/or Bloomberg.
The data are processed in the following ways. First, as seasonal patterns
for some variables could be large enough to muddle the variables’ underlying
dynamics, the series are seasonally adjusted. Note that financial variables
such as stock prices, exchange rates and interest rates are not seasonally
adjusted as we do not believe they have seasonal patterns. The adjustment is
done by either choosing series that are already adjusted or by estimating the
seasonal effects and removing them ”manually”. For the manual adjustment
the X-13-ARIMA program published by US. Census Bureau is used10.
Second, given that a number of important economic variables are only
available at a quarterly frequency (e.g. consumption and employment) these
variable have to be temporally disaggregated into monthly figures to en-
sure a balanced panel. In the statistical literature, there are two broad
categories of approaches to disaggregate low-frequency data into compatible
higher frequency data: (1) mathematical algorithms which ensure a smooth
9See Appendix A for a list over all series and their transformation
10More specifically, we used X-13’s R interface, downloadable at the US. Census Bu-
reau’s home page.
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and continuous curve through the lower frequency benchmark points, and (2)
statistical procedures which uses related higher frequency data to construct
new time-series that is consistent with the low frequency data whilst preserve
the short-term movements in the related higher frequency series [Chamberlin,
2010]. Given that we have a large data set with a number of variables that
need to be disaggregated, identifying proper related higher frequency data
for all quarterly series was considered be too time-consuming11. Therefore,
we choose to use the purely mathematical method to disaggregate the quar-
terly series. The disaggregation is done by using the ECOTRIM software
published by Eurostat, and the Denton12 method without related series was
the algorithm of choice.
Third, since the theoretical models presented in the previous section as-
sume Xt to be I(0) the series were transformed to induce stationarity. The
decision to take logarithm and/or differences is based on unit root tests, more
specifically the augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Given that the augmented
Dickey-Fuller test has been shown to be somewhat sensitive to the number
of lags included in the test, the Ng and Perron’s sequential-t algorithm is used
to determine the optimal number of lags for each variable first. In general,
first differences of logarithms are taken for all non-negative series that are
not already expressed in rates or percentage units, and first differences are
taken for series already in percentage units. Where first differences were not
11Note, however, that there exist a compromise between identifying related higher
frequency indicators for each quarterly variable and purely mathematical approaches. An-
gelini et al. [2006] use the estimated factors as related indicators in the disaggregation and
demonstrated this factor approach has reasonably good performance.
12See Chamberlin [2010] for details on Denton method.
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enough to induce stationarity second differences are taken13. Moreover, the
same type of transformation is generally taken for all variables in the same
category (e.g. first differences of logarithm were taken for all consumption
series).
Lastly, following the standard procedure in principal component analysis
all series was standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. This is done
so that all series are on the same scale, and the same variance will make sure
that the principal component analysis will not be biased towards variables
with large variances.
In regard to data another interesting question is what the ”optimal” com-
position of the data set should. As mentioned earlier, our data set is collected
to reflect a number of economic concepts. In choosing the specific series we
largely follow Bernanke et al. [2005] and other comparable empirical studies.
But, a composition of series that is appropriate for factor analysis for the
US. or Europe might not be optimal for the Norwegian economy. Hence,
there is a risk that we have an unknown number of ”noisy” variables that
do not contribute to the common components, or that they are other im-
portant variables specifically for the Norwegian economy that we have not
included. Also, Boivin and Ng [2006] suggests that little is known in the
literature about how the size and the composition of data affect the factor
estimates. They suggest a method to pre-screen the data set in order to re-
move ”superfluous” variables, and found that factors estimated from as few
as 40 pre-screened variables had better predictive performance than using
the full set of 147 series. However, for our purposes, we do not find this
13If second differences still cannot induce stationarity the variable was dropped.
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kind of pre-screening appropriate. This is because pre-screening reduces the
benefit of time-varying estimation. Since it might well be that certain vari-
ables considered to be superfluous at one time can become very important
at another time.
4.2 Empirical implementation
4.2.1 Choice of policy variable
An important question when estimating a FAVAR (or a standard VAR)
model is what variable should be considered the most appropriate measure
for monetary authority’s policy stance, and thus be interpreted as the key
policy instrument (since most central banks have several policy instruments
at their disposal). In literature several instruments have been considered; re-
serve requirements for the banking sector, monetary aggregates such as M2,
direct lending by the central bank, and even unconventional measures such as
quantitative easing. Still, the most common choice of key policy instrument
is some short-term interest rate controlled by the central bank.
Bernanke and Blinder [1992] were among the first to argue that the federal
funds rate was a good indicator of US. monetary policy. Since then, the bulk
of empirical research on US. monetary policy has modeled the un-forecasted
innovations of the federal funds rate as monetary policy shocks. In the euro
area, the ECB repo rate has often been considered the key policy variable. In
the case of Norway, the obvious choice would be Norges Banks sight deposit
rate14 because Norges Bank explicitly states the deposit rate as its key policy
rate.
14Which is the interest rate on banks’ deposits up to a quota.
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Here, we follow the convention in empirical studies that an effective rate
is used in the estimation rather than the actual target rate. For the US.,
the effective federal funds rate is often used instead of the target federal
funds rate. In the euro zone, the Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA)
is often the preferred proxy for the ECO repo rate. In the case of Norway,
a good candidate for the proxy would be the Norwegian Overnight Average
rate (NOWA), which is an index rate calculated by Norges Bank based on
interbank transaction records. Unfortunately, NOWA is only available from
2011 and therefore not suitable for our applications. Therefore, the 3-month
Norwegian Interbank Offered Rate (NIBOR) was chosen as proxy for the
key policy rate, because it tends to follow the sight deposit rate reasonably
well. Further, other studies on the Norwegian economy using VAR models
such as Bjornland and Jacobsen [2009] and Robstad [2014] have also used
3-month NIBOR as a proxy for monetary policy. Moreover, we assume the
short-term policy rate to be the only observable factor in the economy, i.e.
Yt contains only the policy interest rate. This means we assume that the
policy interest rate does not suffer from measurement error issues, and other
variables commonly included in VARs such as industrial production and price
indices do.
4.2.2 Identification of (FA)VAR
As in a standard VAR, some identifying restrictions must be imposed on the
FAVAR in order to properly identify the monetary policy shocks. This is
because using unrestricted VAR for structural analysis could be extremely
risky as the un-forecasted innovations in the VAR system might be correlated
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with each other and hence making the interpretation of the effects of these
innovations very difficult. For our purposes we follow Bernanke et al. [2005]
and assume the simple recursive structure in which the factors in equation
(15) respond only with a lag (i.e. they do not respond contemporaneously)
to shocks in the montary policy variable. This identification scheme entails
that the policy instrument is ordered after the factors in equation (15), and
treats its innovations as policy shocks.
As we mentioned in literature summary, there are other identification
schemes available to be imposed on a VAR such as sign restrictions, long-run
restrictions, some combinations of long and short-run restrictions and etc.
Bernanke et al. [2005] stress that there is in principal nothing, other than
computational constraints, that prevents using other, non-recursive identifi-
cation schemes in a FAVAR. Nevertheless, the recursive identification, with
its non-requirement of a complete structural model of the economy, have
been shown to deliver empirically believable results. Therefore, we consider
it to be a valid point of departure. Also, an optimal lag length for the
(FA)VAR equal to 1 is chosen with the Schwarz-Bayesian criterion and the
Hannan-Quinn criterion.
4.2.3 Identification of factors
As previously described, in order to estimate the FAVAR model (equations
(15) and (16)) we apply the two-step principal components approach devel-
oped by Bernanke et al. [2005]. The two-step approach is a non-parametric
way to consistently recover the space spanned by both the unobserved factors
Ft and the observed factor Yt, Ct = C(Ft, Yt).
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In the first step, the common components Cˆt are estimated using the first
k+1 principal components15 ofXt. However, it would be incorrect to estimate
a VAR in Cˆt and Yt directly. This is because Cˆt also contains the observed
factor Yt and our choice of the recursive identification scheme described in
the previous subsection require factors not to be contemporaneously affected
by the Yt. Therefore, the two-step estimation requires first controlling the
part Cˆt that corresponds to the policy interest rate. Following Bernanke
et al. [2005], this is achieved in the following way.
Firstly, the data set is divided into a group of ”slow-moving” variables
and a group of ”fast-moving” variables. The slow-moving variables (e.g.
industrial production) are those that are largely predetermined within the
current period, while fast-moving variables (e.g. stock prices) are those that
are more sensitive contemporaneous shocks. Secondly, ”slow-moving” fac-
tors Cˆs(Ft) = Fˆ st are extracted as principal components of the slow-moving
variables. Thirdly, the following regression,
Cˆt = βf Fˆ st + βyYt + et, (20)
is estimated. Finally, the factors Fˆt are constructed as Cˆt − βyYt. With the
factors Fˆt we can now estimate the (FA)VAR in Fˆt and Yt, with recursive
ordering, according to equation (16).
15Note that in the general formulation of the model Cˆt is estimated by the first k +M
principal components. Remember that we assume policy interest rate to be the only
observable factor in the economy, i.e. we set M = 1 and Yt is the policy interest rate
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4.2.4 Number of factors
Applying the Bai and Ng [2002] criteria to determine the optimal number of
(static) factors yielded some rather peculiar results. Using the main specifi-
cation of IC2(k) and calculating for k = (1, 2, ..., 15) showed that IC2(k) is
minimized for k = 1, indicating that in our data set only one static factor
exists. Calculating for PC2(k) for k = (1, 2, ..., 15) gave the conclusion. How-
ever, further testing using k = 1 showed that one factor only explains about
9.8 percent of the variation in our set of 122 variables. Moreover, individu-
ally regressing important variables such as GDP, industrial production and
consumption with k = 1 according to equation (16) showed abysmal adjusted
R2 around 2 to 5 percent. One factor does not seem to explain enough of
the variations in the data to yield empirically meaningful results.
In order to explore this further, we employed the other specifications
suggested by Bai and Ng [2002]. The following results emerge: (1) IC1(k)
gives k = 3, (2) PC1(k) gives k = 1, (3) IC3(k) does not stop decreasing as k
increases, and (4) PC3(k) gives k = 4. The diversity in these results and the
one factor’s inability to explain the variables makes us feel less confidence in
trusting optimal k really is 1.
There may be several reasons for these peculiar results. Firstly, the Bai
and Ng [2002] criteria were developed for when N, T →∞, i.e. they work well
only if the number of periods (sample length) and the number of variables
go to infinity. Since our data set is far from having those dimensions it may
explain the rather inconsistent results based on these information criteria.
Secondly, as mentioned before the composition of our data set was based on
other empirical studies for other countries and thus may not be ”optimal”
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for the Norwegian economy. That is, the data set might contain too many
”noisy” variables that do not contribute to the average common component
of the data set. As more ”noisy” variables are added to the data set the
average common component becomes smaller so that the precise estimation
of the factors become more difficult. Therefore, we do not seem to be able
to determine the optimal number of factors based on the Bai and Ng [2002]
criteria.
Still, trusting the Bai and Ng [2002] criteria exclusively in deciding the
optimal number of factors may not be unproblematic either. Bernanke et al.
[2005] stress that these information criteria only seek to plausibly determine
the number of factors present in the data. They do not, however, address the
important question of how many factors should be included in the (FA)VAR
in order to properly identify effects of monetary policy. Therefore, Bernanke
et al. [2005] determined the number of factors included in the FAVAR in a
more ad hoc fashion. Bernanke et al. [2005] used three factors as their base
specification and found that increasing the number of factors beyond five
did not change the qualitative nature of their results. Several other studies
such as Shibamoto [2007] and McCallum and Smets [2007] employed the
same strategy. Consequently, we also determine the number of factors in
an ad hoc way. We identified k = 6 as a somewhat reasonable compromise
between having too few factors and not being able to explain the data on the
one hand, and choosing too many factors and overfitting the FAVAR on the
other hand16. With k = 6 around 36 percent of the variation in the data set
can be explained.
16Also, for simplicity, we assume the number of factors among the slow-moving variables
is the same as for the entire set.
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4.2.5 Time-varying estimation
The aim of this study is to assess how the effects of monetary policy have
changed over time, especially compared with the situation at the peak of the
crisis. However, the theories outlined in the previous sections are all based
on the assumption of time-invariant coefficients. Both the Stock and Watson
[1998] theories regarding dynamic factor model and the Bernanke et al. [2005]
FAVAR model assume the estimated coefficients to be constant over time,
which implies the effects of monetary policy are also constant. Nevertheless,
the fact that studies such as Bagzibagli [2012] and Ciccarelli et al. [2013]
demonstrated increased effects of monetary policy during the crisis for the
euro area leads us to believe such effects may also exist in Norway. Hence, we
need a strategy to capture potential heterogeneity along the time dimension.
Following Ciccarelli et al. [2013], we allow for time-variation in the coef-
ficients by adopting the technique of estimating our model recursively over
the sample 2000:M1 - 2014:M12. This technique allows us to study the na-
ture of time-variation while keeping the computational costs manageable. It
entails repeated estimation of the model outlined in the previous section,
based on incrementally increased sample length. That is, the first estimation
is run over a sample starting at 2000:M1 and ending at, say, 2007:M1. In
all subsequent estimations we add one month of data at a time, until the
last period of 2014:M12. In this way, we can identify the marginal effects of
additional data and assess the evolution of some key economic relationships
when moving from ”normal” to ”crisis” times.
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brother on September 2008 has often been
considered to mark the start of the global financial crisis. Looking at some
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Norwegian economic data it is worth noticing that variables such as the
benchmark stock price index and industrial production for the manufacturing
sector also peaked and started to decline rapidly during the mid-2008. As
such mid-2008 seems to be a reasonable candidate for the start of the crisis.
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Figure 1: Development of industrial production and stock prices over time
Since an investigation of the crisis period necessarily requires a compar-
ison with ”non-crisis” periods, the sample of the first estimation must end
before mid-2008. Therefore, we choose to set the sample for the first estima-
tion to be 2000:M1 - 2007:M1 and the last estimation period to be 2000:M1 -
2014:M12. In this way the recursive estimation will loop through ”pre-crisis”,
”crisis” and ”post-crisis”17 periods, and a comparison between the crisis and
the non-crisis periods can be made. Hence, our repeated estimation proce-
dure will begin with 2000:M1 - 2007:M1, add one month of data at a time
17Remember that OECD declared already in 2010 that Norway was out of the crisis.
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and loop through 96 different sample lengths until the last one 2000:M1 -
2014:M1218. The changing effects of monetary policy will be investigated by
looking at the impulse response of a number of important economic variables
to a monetary policy shock. Following Fernald et al. [2014], we choose to
investigate the cumulative impulse responses because, as it turns out, the
cumulated responses make visual examination of the changing monetary ef-
fects easier.
For each of the 96 estimations, the procedure will perform factor extrac-
tion, estimate a FAVAR using the estimated factors and calculate impulse
response functions for a particular variable. Subsequently, we pool the 96
impulse responses over all sample periods for that variable together, and
construct a contour map or a ”heat map” which can be examined visually
to assess how effects of monetary policy have changed over these years. This
procedure is applied on the following collection of key economic variables:
real GDP, industrial production, consumption, employment, consumer price
index, and Oslo Stock Exchange benchmark index.
18An algorithm in Stata was designed so that the estimations and looping is done
automatically. See the computational appendix for more details.
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5 Results
5.1 Impulse responses
In this section we present the estimation results in the form of pooled cu-
mulative impulse responses of our six variables to one-standard-deviation
contractionary policy rate shocks. First, as a demonstration of the typical
results from cumulative impulse response functions figure (2) shows the cu-
mulated impulse responses of real GDP and consumption expenditure to a
tightening in monetary policy rate.
Figure (2) shows the responses at one point in time and they come from
an estimation over the first sample period, 2000:M1 - 2007:M1. The impulse
responses seem to be in line with what we might expect from economic the-
ories: both real GDP and consumption expenditure slow in response to a
monetary tightening. The magnitude of the fall seems, however, to be much
larger for consumption than for real GDP. Figure (2) shows that if a con-
tractionary monetary policy shock were to happen on 2007:M1, cumulated
effect on GDP after 50 months would be -0.15, while the cumulated effect on
consumption after 50 months would -3.5.
The cumulated impulse responses for the rest of the variables under con-
sideration follow the same patterns, i.e. they are in line with economic theory
and other empirical studies. It is, however, worth noticing that not all 122
variables in the data set yield plausible results. Producer price index, for
instance, gives the unintuitive result that monetary tightening seems to in-
crease producer prices. This could be due to some misspecification in the
model or be attributed to data set having too many ”noisy” variables since
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Figure 2: Cumulated impulse responses for GDP and consumption expendi-
ture
six factors only explain around 36 percent of all variation in the data. Hence,
for certain variables the model does not seems to be able to properly identify
their responses to monetary policy shocks.
After having obtained the cumulative impulse responses (of the type
shown in figure (2)) for a particular variable the next step is to investigate
whether the responses have changed over the course of the financial crisis.
Figure (3) to (8) show the contour or ”heat” maps for each of the six variables.
Each of these heat maps pool together the (cumulative) impulse responses
for one variable from all of the repeated estimations and thus capture the
potential time-variation in the impulse responses. The horizontal axis of the
heat map shows the number of periods after a monetary policy shock has oc-
curred and has the same meaning as in a standard impulse response graph.
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The vertical axis indicates the different estimation periods outlined in the
previous section. Since all estimation periods have the same starting date,
2000:M1, the vertical axis shows the end date of the sample. Previously, we
defined the sample for the first estimation to be 2000:M1 - 2007:M1, so 1 on
the vertical axis correspond with a sample length of 2000:M1 - 2007:M1 and
2 indicates 2000:M1 - 2007:M2 and so on. So that the result at each month
show the response of the variables of interest based on the information until
that month. The different colors indicate the magnitude of the responses, as
the scale on the right-hand side defines the different levels of magnitude of
response and their corresponding colors. As the colors go from dark blue to
red, so ”increases” the magnitudes of the response of a variable to a monetary
policy shock. To assess potential time-variation in the responses one should
pay particular attention to the part of the heat map to the right (near or
at step = 50) where the map shows the cumulative responses of a variable
around 50 months after a policy shock has occurred.
Figure (3) shows impulse responses of real GDP estimated at different
moments during and around the financial crisis, and the cumulated impulse
response for GDP displayed in figure (2) is expressed as the lowest horizontal
stripe (end date = 1) in figure (3). Interestingly, for real GDP there are clear
time-variation in impulse responses and some distinctive phases emerge. First
of all, for estimations with end dates in 2007 (end date < 12) their strongest
responses at step = 50 tend to be smaller and more muted than for end dates
beyond 2007, as indicated by the blue colors in the beginning of the sample.
Secondly, for a couple of months right after August 2008 (end date> 20) there
seems to be a rather clear increase in cumulative effects of monetary policy
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shock, as the cumulative effect at step=50 quickly changed from around -
0.2 to ca. -0.6 and then back again at -0.2 (as indicated by the change
of color from light blue to dark red). As an illustration, if an one-standard-
deviation policy shock were to happen on November 2008 its cumulated effect
on real GDP after 50 months would be almost -0.6, the strongest response
for all sample. If, instead, the shock were to happen on January 2007 the
cumulated effect on real GDP would be only -0.15 after 50 months. The
most interesting point here is that the strongest responses for real GDP also
roughly coincides with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in late 2008. This
period is considered dramatic even for Norway as Norwegian stock prices fell
rapidly in the second half of 2008 and money markets periodically ceased to
function. It seems the impact of monetary policy strengthens precisely at
the worst moment of the crisis. Thirdly, the second half of the sample from
around 2010 (end date > 40 ) seems much more homogeneous than the first
half, as both the timing and the magnitude of the responses stay quite stable.
This is interesting since we consider Norway to be out of the crisis period
after 2010. In all, the responses of real GDP there seems to provide evidence
for time-variation and that the impact of monetary policy are stronger at the
height of the crisis.
For the responses of industrial production19 and consumption expendi-
ture, figure (4) and (5) paint a similar picture as for real GDP. First, there
is again evidence of time-variation in the responses, since the sample in 2007
give weaker responses than for the rest of the sample, indicated by the blue
colors at the bottom of the heat maps. Second, the strongest responses at
19This is industrial production index for capital goods.
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step=50 again roughly corresponds with the Lehman bankruptcy. For in-
dustrial production the strongest responses seem to happen quite close to
September 2008, while for consumption the strongest responses come a cou-
ple of months after. Third, just as for real GDP the sample beyond 2010/2011
seem to yield rather stable responses for industrial production and consump-
tion. Interestingly, the heat map for consumption shows that in the years
after 2010 the responses are still quite strong compared to the mid to late-
2008, while for industrial production the responses after 2010 are much more
muted compared to its peak responses at mid to late-2008.
The evolution of the price indices, for both consumer and stock, further
strengthen the results shown by the previous variables. The responses of
benchmark index displayed in figure (6) look remarkably similar to those
of real GDP. Responses based on 2007 samples are weaker and slower than
for sample beyond 2007. The strongest responses of benchmark index are
happen in mid till late-2008 and then quickly disappear, and the second half
of the sample yield quite stable responses. The consumer price index shows
once again the strongest responses to be around mid till late 2008, a time
of instability and turmoil. However, the responses of CPI no longer indicate
that the sample in 2007 consistently gives weaker impulse responses than
the rest. Rather, as the estimation period move beyond 2010 the impulse
responses become weaker, and 2013 and 2014 give increasingly slower impulse
responses.
Among the six variables of interest the only one that shows more erratic
impulse responses over time is employment (number of employed persons).
For the first half of the sample (end date < 40 ) there are less clear evidence
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of time-variation than for the other variables. Even though around August
2008 (end date = 20) there still seems to be visible increases in both the
magnitude and pace of the responses, the strongest responses did not happen
in late 2008. Rather, it was from around 2011 that the strongest responses
took place, and the increased magnitude of the responses then suddenly
disappeared around 2012. One reason for this delay could be connected to
the common observation that employment lags after real variables such as
GDP.
In all, the heat maps for the six variables seem to provide evidence for
time-variation in the impulse responses around the time of the financial cri-
sis. Moreover, times during which financial instability is high seem to co-
incide with larger impact of monetary policy. Although the pooled impulse
responses of different variables can be quite diverse, the overall qualitative
results are surprisingly consistent. They are also in line with both the preva-
lent expectations regarding the effects of monetary policy based on economic
theories and previous empirical studies.
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Figure 3: Pooled impulse responses of GDP to an one-standard-deviation
contractionary shocka
aAll heat maps should be read in the following way. The horizontal axis shows the
number of periods after a monetary policy shock has occurred and has the same meaning as
in a standard impulse response graph. The vertical axis indicates the different estimation
periods outlined in the previous section. Since all estimation periods have the same starting
date, 2000:M1, the vertical axis shows the end date of the sample. For instance, since we
defined the sample for the first estimation to be 2000:M1 - 2007:M1, 1 on the vertical axis
indicates that the cumulated response was estimated based on a sample spanning from
2000:M1 - 2007:M1, and 2 indicates 2000:M1 - 2007:M2 and so on. The different colors
indicate the magnitude of the responses at different steps (how ”deep” the responses are at
different steps). The scale on the right-hand side defines the different levels of magnitude
of the cumulated response and their corresponding colors. As the color go from dark
blue to red, so ”increases” the magnitudes of the response of a variable to a monetary
policy shock. To assess potential time-variation in the responses one should pay particular
attention to the part of the heat map to the right (near or at step = 50) where the map
shows the cumulative responses of a variable around 50 months after a policy shock has
occurred.
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Figure 4: Pooled impulse responses of industrial production
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Figure 5: Pooled impulse responses of consumption expenditure
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Figure 6: Pooled impulse responses of stock prices
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Figure 7: Pooled impulse responses of CPI
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Figure 8: Pooled impulse responses of employment
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5.2 Robustness check
Given the fact that one uncertainty in our model is the optimal number of
factors, we re-run our entire procedure with different numbers of factors to
check the sensitivity of our results20. Heat maps (9) - (16) for the variables
are constructed using 4 and 8 factors21.
For GDP, using 4 or 8 factors does not seem to change the main qualitative
result, i.e. the impact of a monetary policy shock seems to be the strongest
precisely at the worst moment of the crisis. However, the rather homogeneous
responses after 2010 when using 6 factors seem to disappear with 4 or 8
factors. Although the responses after 2010 are still weaker than at the height
of the crisis, there are more variation in the responses after 2010 when using 4
or 8 factors. Also, the magnitude of the strongest responses seem to decrease
with the number factors, i.e. the strongest responses are -0.84, -0.60 and
-0.37 for 4, 6 and 8 factors respectively.
For consumption and stock price index the heat maps with 4 and 8 factors
look remarkably similar to those with 6 factors. For both, the strongest
responses again seem to coincide with Lehman bankruptcy and the responses
after 2010 are quite homogeneous. Again, the magnitude of the strongest
response around the periods right after August 2008 seem to decrease with
the number of factors.
For CPI, the heat map with 4 factors seem quite similar to the one with
6 factors. Both maps show a graduate increase in the impact of policy
20In the interest of space, industrial production index is not included in the robustness
checks because real GDP and industrial production cover somewhat similar concept. Em-
ployment is not included because its heat map did not show its strongest responses around
the height of the crisis.
21Remember in the main specification: k = 6.
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shock during the period right before August 2008, with the magnitude of
the strongest impact with 4 factors larger than the one with 6 factors. With
8 factors the strongest responses still happen during the period right before
August 2008, but the responses after 2010 become more homogeneous like
for the other variables.
All things considered, it seems changing the number of factors do not
change our main conclusion, i.e. the responses of key variables are time-
varying and monetary policy is most potent around height of the financial
crisis.
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Figure 11: Pooled impulse responses of consumption using 4 factors
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Figure 12: Pooled impulse responses of consumption using 8 factors
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Figure 13: Pooled impulse responses of stock prices using 4 factors
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Figure 14: Pooled impulse responses of stock prices using 8 factors
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Figure 15: Pooled impulse responses of CPI using 4 factors
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Figure 16: Pooled impulse responses of CPI using 8 factors
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed how the effects of monetary policy in Norway
might have been changing over time. In particular, we have paid special
attention to how the impact of policy shocks on key variables have evolved
around the time of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 2008,
commonly considered to be one of the worst moments of the recent financial
crisis.
By using a FAVAR model based on a large data set of 122 Norwegian
variables and estimating the model recursively from 2000:M1 to 2014:M12,
we have shown that the effects of monetary policy on our variables are in-
deed time-varying. The impulse responses of all six variables (GDP, indus-
trial production, consumption, CPI, stock price index and employment) to
a monetary policy shock first remain somewhat constant before the crisis,
and subsequently strengthen as we move into the crisis period. Moreover,
for all but one variable (employment) we find that the cumulated effect of
a policy shock seems to be the strongest precisely during the worst moment
of the crisis - the period right after bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. That
is, if a monetary policy shock were to happen around that time, its impact
on the above-mentioned variables would have been more potent compared to
other periods. The implication of our results is that the strong actions by
the monetary authority in Norway during the financial crisis were warranted.
Furthermore, people’s impaired confidence in monetary authorities’ ability to
affect the economy during the crisis may have been built on false premises,
as the impact of central banks in the crisis could have been underestimated.
An important caveat in our analysis is that we have not, in a systematic
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way, tried determine why the impact of monetary policy seems to be am-
plified at the height of the crisis. One possible explanation is related to the
credit channel theory of monetary policy transmission mechanism. When fi-
nancial frictions in the credit market increases substantially due to the crisis,
a higher external finance premium has to be paid by the borrowers. This
should, via the credit channel, lead to higher effects of a monetary policy
shock on variables such as GDP [Ciccarelli et al., 2013]. In this regard, a
possible extension of our work could be to include more balance sheet vari-
ables and credit conditions for both financial and non-financial borrowers
and investigate further the credit channel of monetary policy. Another in-
teresting extension could be to see if we, instead of looking at this recent
crisis, investigate some previous crises in Norway. A good candidate for a
such crisis would be the banking crisis in Norway in the late 1980s. If similar
results were to be found also for the banking crisis it could imply that the
strengthened impact of monetary policy during a crisis is a more permanent,
structural feature of the economy rather than an one-off outcome of the most
recent crisis.
At the time of writing, Europe seems to be on the verge of another period
of financial turmoil. The Greek government has yet to come to an agreement
with its European counterparts on structural economic reforms necessary to
receive more bailout funds, which the country desperately needs to avoid a
default on its debt. However, as it stands right now the probability of a
Greek default and an exit from the eurozone seems to increase by the day. If
such events were to come to pass we have, at the very least, reason to believe
that monetary policies would again rise to the occasion.
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Appendix A: Data description and transformation
The table below shows the list of data series used in the estimation and
their transformations. The list contains only ”informational” variables used
in factor extraction. The transformation codes are as follows: 1 - first dif-
ference, 2 - second difference, 3 - logarithm, 4 - first difference of logarithm,
5 - second difference of logarithm. An asterisk next to the name denote a
variable assumed to be fast-moving in the estimation
Name Tr.
Industrial production - intermediate goods (2005=100) 4
Industrial production - capital goods (2005=100) 4
Industrial production - capital goods (2005=100) 4
Industrial production - total (2005=100) 4
Industrial production - extraction and related services (2005=100) 4
Industrial production - mining and quarrying (2005=100) 3
Industrial production - manufacturing (2005=100) 4
Industrial production - electricity, gas and steam (2005=100) 3
Industrial production - durable consumer goods (2005=100) 4
Industrial production - non-durable consumer goods (2005=100) 3
Industrial production - consumer goods (total) (2005=100) 3
GDP - final consumption of households (NOK million) 4
GDP - final consumption of general government (NOK million) 4
Gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) (NOK million) 5
Total exports (NOK million) 3
Total imports (NOK million) 4
GDP - total (market value) (NOK million) 4
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Name Tr.
Consumption expenditure - total (NOK million) 4
Consumption expenditure - durable goods (NOK million) 4
Consumption expenditure - non-durable goods (NOK million) 4
Consumption expenditure - semi-durable (NOK million) 5
Consumption expenditure - services (NOK million) 5
Employment - total (thousands of persons) 3
Employment - employed persons (thousands of persons) 5
Employment - self-employed (thousands of persons) 5
Employment - family workers (thousands of persons) 4
Employment - hours worked: total (thousands of persons) 3
Employment - hours worked: employed persons (thousands of persons) 4
Employment - hours worked: self-employed (thousands of persons) 3
Employment - hours worked: family workers (thousands of persons) 5
Employment - agriculture and forestry (thousands of persons) 4
Employment - mining and quarrying (thousands of persons) 5
Employment - oil and gas extraction (thousands of persons) 4
Employment - manufacturing (thousands of persons) 5
Employment - electricity, gas and steam (thousands of persons) 4
Employment - construction (thousands of persons) 5
Employment - wholesale and retail trade(thousands of persons) 5
Employment - transport activities (thousands of persons) 4
Employment - financial and insurance activities (thousands of persons) 5
Employment - general government (thousands of persons) 5
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Name Tr.
Unemployment - unemployed persons: total (thousands of persons) 5
Unemployment - duration 1-4 weeks (thousands of persons) 4
Unemployment - duration 5-13 weeks (thousands of persons) 5
Unemployment - duration 14-26 weeks (thousands of persons) 4
Average monthly earning - oil and gas extraction and mining (2005=100) 4
Average monthly earning - manufacturing (2005=100) 5
Average monthly earning - electricity, gas and steam (2005=100) 5
Average monthly earning - construction (2005=100) 5
Average monthly earning - wholesale and retail trade (2005=100) 4
Average monthly earning - transportation and storage (2005=100) 5
Consumer price index - all items (1998 = 100) 3
Consumer price index - food and non-alcoholic beverages (1998 = 100) 4
Consumer price index - alcoholic beverages and tobacco (1998 = 100) 4
Consumer price index - clothing and footwear (1998 = 100) 4
Consumer price index - housing, water, electricity, gas(1998 = 100) 4
Consumer price index - health (1998 = 100) 4
Consumer price index - transport (1998 = 100) 4
Consumer price index - miscellaneous goods and services (1998 = 100) 5
Producer price index - intermediate goods (2000 = 100) 5
Producer price index - investment goods (2000 = 100) 4
Producer price index - consumer goods (total) (2000 = 100) 4
Producer price index - durable consumer goods (2000 = 100) 4
Producer price index - non-durable consumer goods (2000 = 100) 4
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Name Tr.
Producer price index - energy goods (2000 = 100) 5
Producer price index - industry total (2000 = 100) 5
Producer price index - extraction and related services (2000 = 100) 5
Producer price index - manufacturing (2000 = 100) 5
Producer price index - mining and quarrying (2000 = 100) 4
Producer price index - electricity, gas and steam (2000 = 100) 3
Commodity price index (2000 = 100) 5
Stock prices* - Oslo Stock Exchange: all-share index 4
Stock prices* - Oslo Stock Exchange: benchmark index 4
Stock prices* - Oslo Stock Exchange: mutual fund index 4
Stock prices* - Oslo Stock Exchange: small cap index 4
Stock prices* - Oslo Stock Exchange: OBX index 5
Stock prices* - Oslo Stock Exchange: oil service index 4
Exchange rate* - USD per NOK 4
Exchange rate* - EUR per NOK 4
Exchange rate* - GBP per NOK 5
Exchange rate* - CHF per NOK 4
Exchange rate* - SEK per NOK 4
Exchange rate* - JPY per NOK 4
Exchange rate* - import-weighted 4
Exchange rate* -competition index 4
Monetary aggregates* - M0 4
Monetary aggregates* - M1 5
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Name Tr.
Monetary aggregates* - M2 5
Gross domestic debt* - general government (NOK million) 3
Gross domestic debt* - non-financial corporations (NOK million) 5
Gross domestic debt* - households etc. (NOK million) 5
Dwelling starts* - Oslo 3
Dwelling starts* - mid-Norway 4
Dwelling starts* - east 4
Dwelling starts* - south 4
Dwelling starts* - west 4
Dwelling starts* - north 4
Dwelling starts* - total 4
Capacity utilization rate - manufacturing, mining and quarrying 2
Capacity utilization rate - intermediate goods 2
Capacity utilization rate - capital goods 2
Capacity utilization rate - consumer goods (total) 2
Confidence indicator* - manufacturing, mining and quarrying 2
Confidence indicator* - intermediate goods 1
Confidence indicator* - capital goods 2
Confidence indicator* - consumer goods (total) 1
Confidence indicator* - consumer expectation 1
Interest rate* - treasury bill 3-month 1
Interest rate* - treasury bill 6-month 1
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Name Tr.
Interest rate* - treasury bill 9-month 1
Interest rate* - treasury bill 12-month 1
Interest rate* - government bond 3-year 1
Interest rate* - government bond 5-year 1
Interest rate* - government bond 10-year 1
Interest rate* - spread between 3-month and key policy rate 1
Interest rate* - spread between 6-month and key policy rate 1
Interest rate* - spread between 9-month and key policy rate 1
Interest rate* - spread between 12-month and key policy rate 1
Interest rate* - spread between 3-year and key policy rate 1
Interest rate* - spread between 5-year and key policy rate 1
Interest rate* - spread between 10-year and key policy rate 1
Inventory index* - manufacturing 3
New order index* : manufacturing (2005 = 100) 2
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Appendix B: Computational issues
Here, we seek to explain how our estimation procedure is structured in
Stata. The estimation program is done in 5 steps; (1) data processing, (2)
Bai and Ng [2002] information criteria, (3) factor estimation , (4) (FA)VAR
estimation, and (5) calculation of pooled impulses responses. The entire
program is structured in the following way. Actual Stata-codes are available
upon request from the authors.
• Define a program for data processing, called ”cdata”
– Set program parameters; (1) method22, (2) significance level, (3)
sample length.
– Design algorithm so that for each variable that are not already
expressed in percentage points or rates: check if taking logarithm
is enough to induce stationarity using augmented Dickey-Fuller
test23. If not, check if taking first-difference of log is enough. If
not, check if second difference log is enough. If not, drop variable.
And for each variable that are already expressed in percentage
points or rates: check if taking first-difference is enough to induce
stationarity. If not, check if taking second-difference is enough. If
not, drop variable. Next, standardize all retained variables. The
looping is done using the ”foreach” and ”if...else” environments.
– Run ”cdata” with the desired parameters.
22Only the method described below was used in the actual estimation
23Note that the number of lags to include is determined by Ng and Perron’s sequential-t
algorithm
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• Calculate Bai and Ng [2002] information criteria according to the equa-
tions outlined in the previous section. Note that the residuals were
found by taking the difference between the actual time-series and ”re-
constructed” series calculated with command ”predict, fit” after using
”pca”.
• Define a program for factor estimation, called ”fex”
– Set program parameters; (1) policy instrument/variable, (2) num-
ber (k+1) of factors to be extracted and included in FAVAR, (3)
sample length for recursive estimation.
– Extract ”initial factors”, i.e. recover the space spanned by both
F and Y , C(F, Y ) = k + 1 first principal components. This is
done with the ”pca”-command, and scaled according to Stock and
Watson [1998]
– Remove space spanned by Y, i.e. remove dependency of C(F,Y)
on Y to obtain estimates of factors. This is done with the ”pca”-
command, and scaled according to Stock and Watson [1998]
• Define a program for running FAVAR, called ”favar”
– Set program parameters; (1) number of lags in the VAR, (2) num-
ber of steps for the cumulated impulse responses.
– Set A and B matrices for Cholesky identification.
– Run VAR in factors and policy variable using the ”svar”-command,
and create impulse responses of factors to policy shocks.
– Merge impulse responses with existing data set.
70
• Run recursive estimation using the programs we have already defined
– For one particular variable, loop through 96 different sample length
starting with 2000:M1 - 2007:M1 and ending with 2001:M1 - 2014:M12.
This is done by changing the parameter for end date in ”fex”
– Each of the 96 estimations will use ”fex” and ”favar” programs,
and obtain factor loadings by regressing the variable on factors
and policy variable
– For example an estimation for 2000:M1 - 2007:M1 would look like:
∗ qui fex 1 7 1 2000 1 2007 1
∗ qui favar 1 50
∗ reg x f*(factors) i(policy instrument)
– With the factor loadings and responses of factors, responses of
variables can be calculated
– The entire procedure can be done for the variables of choice
• Having all 96 impulses responses of a variable to a policy shock we can
now use ”twoway contour” to make the heat map.
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